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For the past two decades, the need to shield strategic maritime interests, to tackle criminality 16 
and terrorism at or from the sea and to conserve valuable marine resources has been 17 
recognized at the highest political level. Acknowledging and accounting for the interplay 18 
between climate change, the vulnerability of coastal populations and the occurrence of 19 
maritime criminality should be part of any ocean governance process. Still, given the complex 20 
interactions between climate change and socio-economic components of the marine realm, it 21 
has become urgent to establish a solid methodological framework, which could lead to sound 22 
and effective decisions. We propose that any such framework should not be built from 23 
scratch. The adaptation of well tested, existing uncertainty-management tools, such as 24 
Cumulative Effect Assessments, could serve as a solid basis to account for the magnitude and 25 
directionality of the dependencies between the impacts of climate change and the occurrence 26 
of maritime criminality, offering spatial explicit risk evaluations. Multi-Criteria Decision 27 
Making could then be employed to better and faster inform decision-makers. These 28 
mechanisms could provide a framework for comparison of alternative mitigation and 29 
adaptation actions and are essential in assessing responses to tackle maritime crime in the 30 
context of climate change. 31 
 32 
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1. Environmental and social complexities in marine and coastal systems 37 
 38 
Coastal and marine systems provide critical environmental and social values, supporting the 39 
maintenance of human health and welfare (Costanza et al. 1997; Martínez et al. 2007). Still, 40 
coastal zones and the marine sites out to the continental shelf break are listed within the most 41 
heavily used and vulnerable systems of the planet, with climate change recognized as a major 42 
threat (Grebmeier 2011; Harley et al. 2006; Wise et al. 2014). Ample evidence is now 43 
available demonstrating that climate change alters ecosystem functionality and structure, 44 
biotic community composition and fisheries (Cheung et al. 2010; Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 45 
2010; Pinsky et al. 2013). At the same time, it is acknowledged that the response mechanisms 46 
of natural and social systems could be eroded by the magnitude of global climate change, 47 
threatening societal stability and even triggering violent conflicts and criminal behaviors at 48 
national, regional and global scales (Barnett 2003; Gemenne et al. 2014; Gleditsch 2012; 49 
Hsiang and Burke 2014; Scheffran et al. 2012). 50 
 51 
Security issues (e.g. illegal fishing, piracy, drug and arms smuggling, illegal immigration and 52 
human trafficking) in the sensitive maritime domain have recently received considerable 53 
attention at higher political levels (Bueger 2015; Germond 2015). Still, the magnitude and 54 
directionality of the links and dependencies between maritime criminality and alternative 55 
stressors, such as the impacts of climate change on marine ecosystems and down the line on 56 
human systems, have not yet systematically been analyzed. Consequently, the methodological 57 
framework that could offer the basis for a systematic management and spatial mitigation 58 
planning is missing even though this need has somewhat been recognized by states and 59 
supranational actors (e.g. Council of the EU 2014; HM Government 2014). 60 
 61 
Social vulnerabilities, criminality and environmental components are linked through multiple 62 
pathways altering safety and good governance within the maritime domain (Cochrane et al. 63 
2009; Pomeroy et al. 2016). A critical step for effective long-term planning and adaptive 64 
management of coastal and marine systems is to incorporate this complexity into decision-65 
making processes and governance mechanisms (Stelzenmüller et al. 2018). Still, the 66 
successful application of any assessment method would require reliable information on the 67 
distribution of security components and on the expected impacts from multiple 68 
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sources/activities, which is not always available. An additional challenge consists in finding 69 
how to incorporate impacts which are not easily predictable (e.g. stochastic extreme weather 70 
events) and/or could emerge as a complex network of relationships (e.g. extreme weather 71 
events that impact upon poverty or food security), whose magnitude and directionality are still 72 
uncertain (Jones et al. 2016; Judd et al. 2015; Scheffran et al. 2012). For example, direct 73 
evaluations of the links between climate change and violent conflicts or criminal activities are 74 
often complicated due to uncertainties in the quantitative data used to establish the 75 
associations (Gleditsch 2012). Similarly, methodological difficulties in distinguishing whether 76 
identified impacts are related to climate or to short term weather fluctuations, or the ability to 77 
delineate various other variables that can explain the occurrence of violence, highlight the 78 
uncertainties associated with this field of research (Baldwin 2014; Barnett 2003; Barnett and 79 
Adger 2007; Gemenne et al. 2014; Gleditsch 2012). 80 
 81 
What is currently lacking is the science that integrates the multiple links between climate 82 
change and the occurrence of maritime criminality, while considering the assumptions 83 
underlying the role, estimation, quantification and sensitivity of background factors 84 
structuring these links (Scheffran et al. 2012). In this paper, we suggest that the means to 85 
conceptualize, quantify and evaluate the magnitude and directionality of the links and 86 
dependencies between climate change and the occurrence of maritime criminality can be 87 
found in well-established cross-disciplinary research achievements. As a first step toward 88 
building an adequate framework for analysis and planning, we propose to adapt existing and 89 
comprehensive methodologies and tools commonly used for evaluating environmental risks. 90 
These tools are widely used for informing conservation planning and guiding management 91 
decisions; we propose that they could also be used to inform how maritime security as a social 92 
risk could interact with, and be exacerbated by, climate change at local, national, regional and 93 
global scales. 94 
 95 
 96 
2. Climate change dimensions in maritime security  97 
 98 
Climate change alters maritime security without causing violent conflicts and threatening the 99 
integrity of states directly. Floods, changes in the ocean biophysical conditions, expansion of 100 
invasive species, changes in production of marine fish and shellfish species are all linked to 101 
climate change causing serious degradations of the functionality, structure and services of 102 
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coastal and marine systems (Cheung et al. 2009; Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 2010; 103 
McGranahan et al. 2007). Shipping hazards and damage to maritime infrastructure as 104 
outcomes of extreme weather events, fish stock reduction and the redistribution of marine 105 
biodiversity could negatively impact livelihoods, incomes and health, leading to social, 106 
political and economic collapse. Eventually, such conditions could create incentives to engage 107 
in various forms of criminal behavior. 108 
 109 
Poor management strategies and loose surveillance are often attributed to poverty, economic 110 
collapse and environmental degradation, which coexist with climate risks (Allison et al. 2009; 111 
Cinner et al. 2012). Ineffective management sets the stage for cascading effects such as 112 
overexploitation of marine resources, food scarcity or water pollution by domestic and 113 
industrial wastes. Climate-driven changes in people’s living and working environments, could 114 
also influence displacement and migration patterns, increase health risk, strengthen 115 
competition for resources and alter geopolitical stability (McMichael et al. 2012). In turn, 116 
these dimensions of social instability activate factors of maritime insecurity such as illegal 117 
fishing, piracy, drug trafficking and arms smuggling, as well as illegal immigration and 118 
human trafficking. For example, Jasparro and Taylor (2008) have highlighted the link 119 
between climate change, degradation of fisheries and socio-economic conditions, and the 120 
occurrence of piracy in South-East Asia. The importance of socio-economic components, in 121 
addition to physical and ecological ones, towards assessing the complex impacts of climate 122 
change upon fishery has also been acknowledged (Cochrane et al. 2009). Similarly, the need 123 
to put in relation  climate change impacts and bad governance has been highlighted to explain 124 
the occurrence or strengthening of illegal practices regarding fishery (Allison and Kelling 125 
2009).  126 
 127 
Crucially, the dependencies between climate change and maritime security are not 128 
unidirectional (Fig. 1). Indeed, the sustainable development of coastal communities may be 129 
undermined by illegal activities performed at or from the sea (Malcolm 2017), feeding back 130 
the loop. For example, maritime crime threatens marine ecosystem integrity through illegal 131 
fishing (Agnew et al. 2009) or jeopardize conservation efforts through piracy or redirection of 132 
financial aid (Mazaris 2017; Mazaris et al. 2016). Illegal fishing activities result from 133 
pressures likely to increasingly originate in climate change (such as scarcity of fish resources) 134 
and then in turn affect fisheries resources (Pomeroy et al. 2016). Ultimately, further such 135 
pressures on sensitive ecosystems and challenges to the blue economy (i.e. sustainability and 136 
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economic development in the marine and maritime sectors) can in turn trigger additional 137 
motivations to engage in maritime crime. This is a synergistic process, which results in an 138 
exponential loop of environmental issues, structural pressures on the social, political and 139 
economic systems, and maritime crimes.  140 
 141 
In sum, the magnitude of social and economic sectors relying upon the marine realm 142 
contributes to a complex array of receptors but also constitutes an additional source of 143 
pressures for the sensitive marine ecosystems (Atkins et al. 2011). Overexploitation of marine 144 
resources, illegal migration and human trafficking, are all vectors of instability which could 145 
be intensified under social, political or economic unrest (McMichael et al. 2012). An 146 
inadequate consideration of the interactions, the underlying drivers and the cumulative 147 
impacts of pressures and activities, along with the multidimensional impacts of climate 148 




3. Promoting standardized planning tools 153 
 154 
The question of how to identify the magnitude and directionality of various factors and 155 
processes, and also how to quantify and evaluate their cumulative, incompatible or 156 
multiplicative effects upon various receptors, is not novel (Borja et al. 2016; Korpinen and 157 
Andersen 2016). This is also the case for the complex role of the continuous and dynamic 158 
threat of climate change (Costanza et al. 1997). Understanding how climate change triggers 159 
responses and poses alterations to natural and socio-economic systems and how this could 160 
accelerate, interact and feed upon existing pressures represents a major scientific challenge 161 
(Barnett and Adger 2007; Gemenne et al. 2014).  162 
 163 
Methodologies endorsed within the wider context of Cumulative Effect Assessment (CEA) 164 
allow identifying causalities of multiple pressures operating at various temporal and spatial 165 
scales, offering the means for systematic, spatially explicit action planning (Borja et al. 2016; 166 
Crain et al. 2008). The basic aim of CEAs is to cover the wide vector of anthropogenic 167 
pressures and estimate their additive, multiplicative, synergistic and antagonistic impacts 168 
upon selected ecosystem components (e.g. habitats, populations). Depending on the scope of 169 
the assessment and action planning (e.g. reserve selection, evaluation of environmental status, 170 
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prioritization of management and mitigation measures), CEAs could be applied at local, 171 
national, regional are even continental scales (Judd et al 2015). Even if initiated from a 172 
scientific, political or legal perspective, the basic rationale behind CEA is to spatially overlay 173 
multiple pressures and assess their impact on ecosystem components (e.g. species, 174 
communities, ecosystem functions). The impact of a pressure upon the target ecosystem’s 175 
features is assessed either through numeric evidence (e.g. spatial extent of degradation, 176 
species population reduction) or categorically as the outputs of expert consultations (Korpinen 177 
and Andersen 2016). Under this context, once the impacts of climate change and interactions 178 
with other pressures are conceptualized, they become part of the assessment process (Therivel 179 
and Ross 2007).  180 
 181 
Drawing from the theory behind CEAs, we could distill a set of opportunities offered to 182 
address challenges in managing maritime security risks in the context of climate change. A 183 
major challenge in assessing risks within complex systems consists in the limited quantitative 184 
evidence on the combination or interaction between social, economic and environmental 185 
stressors; one way that CEAs could overcome this limitation is by applying impact weighting 186 
factors for any combination between specific pressure and ecosystem component (Korpinen 187 
and Andersen 2016). This weighting scheme reflects “vulnerabilities” to pressures and could 188 
be fed by expert opinion, while multiple interactions (i.e. weighting schemes) could be 189 
applied and progressively analyzed. Under the context of CEA, an analysis of maritime 190 
security could be done once a series of environmental or social components, which reflect the 191 
concern of stakeholders, have been selected so as to capture a holistic picture of the 192 
phenomena under evaluation. For example, when there is a need to prioritize actions towards 193 
mitigating and managing regional maritime insecurity issues, weighting indicators of selected 194 
components could serve as a first step to assess the relative effects of these potential actions 195 
(Mitchell and Parkins 2011). In this case one could ask how climate change might alter well-196 
functioning governance (i.e. social component) by considering and weighting a set of 197 
alternative indicators (e.g. quality of the civil service, cultural support, control of corruption); 198 
similarly, expansion of criminal activities could be reflected by a set of economic and social 199 
indicators (e.g. altered conditions of the business environment, increased access to some 200 
technologies, etc.).   201 
 202 
Often, quantitative evidence to support a direct link between climate change and the extent of 203 
a security issue (e.g. initiation of violent conflict) are not available (Baldwin, 2014; Barnett 204 
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2003; Barnett and Adger 2007). An additional principle that is often adopted by marine CEAs 205 
towards informing conservation and management planning is the validation of applied impact 206 
scores, which can even operate under a lack of information on links and dependencies 207 
between different drivers, components or actors. For example, the objective of a regional 208 
study might be to inform decision-makers and generate a spatially explicit risk assessment on 209 
activities against mariners and shipping by considering multiple stressors including climate 210 
change. In this case, uncertainty analyses could be run in order to generate sets of results 211 
under alternative assumptions of the type of interactions and data inputs; similarly, 212 
simulation-based sensitivity analyses could determine the relative importance of each stressor, 213 
including climate change, upon overall assessment (Stock and Micheli 2016). Uncertainty and 214 
sensitivity analyses would allow delineating which are the most critical stressors (e.g. food 215 
scarcity) and how they could be accelerated by the secondary impacts of climate change (e.g. 216 
pressure upon population health). At the same time, they could exemplify the information 217 
gaps and bridge them to generate a spatially explicit assessment output.  218 
 219 
Once CEA has allowed better grasping the way climate change and maritime criminality 220 
variables interact, then multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) frameworks represent 221 
reasonable variety of approaches to assess the interactions of physical, biological and human 222 
systems, and address the consequences of actions and decisions upon policies and planning 223 
(Huang et al. 2011; McGranahan et al. 2007; McMichael et al. 2012). Similar to the case of 224 
maritime security issues, the intensity and reciprocity of the interactions inherent to decisions 225 
on many environmental and energy issues are not always straightforward and thus subroutines 226 
must be developed to account for the uncertainty of the inputs and the variation in sensitivity 227 
of the outputs. For example, in order to tackle maritime crime at a national scale, key 228 
vulnerable groups should be identified and the basis for cooperation (e.g. though financial 229 
support, small-scale infrastructure) could be recognized.  230 
 231 
The same concerns apply to climate change, which, considered as a major driver of change 232 
and/or as a source of uncertainty in decision-making, is incorporated into multi-criteria, 233 
integrative assessments aiming to guide effective management (Bell et al. 2003; Pinsky et al. 234 
2013). Decision-makers operating in the field of maritime security and risk mitigation could 235 
benefit from MCDM tools towards setting an action plan while accounting for social and 236 
behavioral patterns, legislation, governance and risk factors, irreversible impacts, as well as 237 
prevention and adaptation costs. For instance, decisions based on series of available options 238 
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could be informed by the need to maximize the adequacy of international financial 239 
investments to support safety, health and economic development of communities that are 240 
considered at risk from the point of view of the interaction between climate change and 241 
maritime security. Similarly, under conditions of severe maritime crime, a prioritization 242 
should be made on whether irreversible impacts for the community would be driven by the 243 
exposure to extreme weather events or any other factors such as illegal fishing. 244 
 245 
 246 
4. Building consensus and capacity 247 
 248 
The outputs of any risk assessment and thus of any decision-making processes should be 249 
accompanied by a detailed description of the methodological choices and their potential 250 
limitations (Judd et al. 2015). Tools based upon the concept of CEA could offer the means to 251 
spatially define risk hotspots in respect to selected and predictable indicators that are relevant 252 
to policy level developments. On the other hand, MCDM contributes to a better management 253 
of the risks by improving decision-making. The two tools could further complement each 254 
other, as CEAs could generate spatially explicit assessments recognizing critical locations or 255 
components for intervention (e.g. spotting communities that are under higher pressure due to 256 
criminality) while MCDM could build upon such background to devise optimal decisions on 257 
actions over a set of alternatives.    258 
 259 
To further add clarity, the improvement of data quality, the application of standardized 260 
monitoring schemes and the careful interpretation of the outputs are critical steps for the 261 
success of any assessment. Apart from enhancing parameterization of uncertainty-262 
management tools, the identification of simple pathways over complex networks of 263 
interacting drivers (e.g. human activities, societal attitudes) could help to translate outputs 264 
into prioritization of governance initiatives and policies (Martínez et al. 2007). Often, a first 265 
step to standardize assessment processes is to achieve a consensus on the terminology 266 
commonly employed to describe components, indicators and impacts (Judd et al. 2015; 267 
Stelzenmüller et al. 2018). 268 
 269 
The mitigation of the effects of climate change on natural and human marine systems requires 270 
interactive decision-making and management processes, grouping various state and non-state 271 
stakeholders and spanning across multiple dimensions and scales. Therefore, making the 272 
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outputs of the maritime security assessment tools useful for governance requires a science-273 
policy dialogue towards co-designing questions, inputs and indicators. Once the alignment 274 
between available scientific information and policy-makers’ needs is achieved, regulations, 275 
policies, strategies and commitments need to be formed. 276 
 277 
Acknowledging the uncertainty inherent to any decision-making process, centers for 278 
integrated research where background information, existing tools and datasets could be 279 
synthesized, can provide answers and technical solutions. We urge scholars, research 280 
institutions and think tanks to start building the foundations for such integrated centers of 281 
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 383 
Figure 1: The multidirectional dependencies between climate change and maritime security 384 
proceed from the complex interplay between the effects of climate change on natural and 385 
human systems and actors’ responses to impacts. In turn, these responses, including criminal 386 
behaviors, feed the loop back, since actors are both objects and agents of impacts. Cumulative 387 
Effect Assessments (CEA) and Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) could be adopted to 388 
better inform actors and gradually drive mitigation, adaptation and management planning.     389 
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